There is ample evidence that the average person thinks he or she is more skilful, more beautiful and kinder than others 1,2 and that such overconfidence may result in substantial personal and social costs 3-8 . To explain the prevalence of overconfidence, social scientists usually point to its affective benefits, such as those stemming from a good self-image or reduced anxiety about an uncertain future 9-13 . An alternative theory, first advanced by evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers 14-16 , posits that people self-deceive into higher confidence to more effectively persuade or deceive others. Here we conduct two experiments (combined n = 688) to test this strategic self-deception hypothesis. After performing a cognitively challenging task, half of our subjects are informed that they can earn money if, during a short face-to-face interaction, they convince others of their superior performance. We find that the privately elicited beliefs of the group that was informed of the profitable deception opportunity exhibit significantly more overconfidence than the beliefs of the control group. To test whether higher confidence ultimately pays off, we experimentally manipulate the confidence of the subjects by means of a noisy feedback signal. We find that this exogenous shift in confidence makes subjects more persuasive in subsequent face-to-face interactions. Overconfidence emerges from these results as the product of an adaptive cognitive technology with important social benefits, rather than some deficiency or bias.
There is ample evidence that the average person thinks he or she is more skilful, more beautiful and kinder than others 1, 2 and that such overconfidence may result in substantial personal and social costs [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . To explain the prevalence of overconfidence, social scientists usually point to its affective benefits, such as those stemming from a good self-image or reduced anxiety about an uncertain future [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . An alternative theory, first advanced by evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers [14] [15] [16] , posits that people self-deceive into higher confidence to more effectively persuade or deceive others. Here we conduct two experiments (combined n = 688) to test this strategic self-deception hypothesis. After performing a cognitively challenging task, half of our subjects are informed that they can earn money if, during a short face-to-face interaction, they convince others of their superior performance. We find that the privately elicited beliefs of the group that was informed of the profitable deception opportunity exhibit significantly more overconfidence than the beliefs of the control group. To test whether higher confidence ultimately pays off, we experimentally manipulate the confidence of the subjects by means of a noisy feedback signal. We find that this exogenous shift in confidence makes subjects more persuasive in subsequent face-to-face interactions. Overconfidence emerges from these results as the product of an adaptive cognitive technology with important social benefits, rather than some deficiency or bias.
This study contributes to the literature on self-deception, motivated cognition and cognitive dissonance, including a growing number of studies that investigate these phenomena in economic contexts [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that a desire to persuade others generates overconfidence. Some previous studies provide evidence that is suggestive of this mechanism. In particular, overconfidence about performance on a cognitive test correlates with measures of social dominance 22, 23 . Strategic motives such as the desire to impress an audience affect public statements of confidence [24] [25] [26] , although it is not clear to what extent the communicators themselves believe their own statements. The desire to persuade others about an external event can result in biased information gathering and distorted beliefs 27 . In the study most related to ours, individuals who are primed with a desire to achieve status rate themselves higher relative to others on a series of skills and abilities relevant to attaining status in a business context 22 . Our experiment goes beyond this by studying the effect of anticipating an actual social interaction rather than the effect of a prime. Moreover, because we give participants incentives for the accuracy of their privately reported probabilistic beliefs, our results are strong evidence for self-deception.
Our second contribution is to provide rigorous causal evidence that privately held confidence about one's own performance leads to social success through both verbal and non-verbal channels. Previous work has mostly focused on the effects of stated or expressed confidence. It shows that experimental subjects have a preference for more confident probability statements by experts or advisors 28 and rate them as more convincing [29] [30] [31] . Various selfenhancement techniques are associated with higher performance in job interviews and other social situations 16, 32, 33 . The focus on stated confidence leaves unanswered the role of private, truly held confidence in persuasion. This is a key distinction in the evolutionary theory of Trivers, who maintains that self-deception arises from the fact that truly held confidence cannot be convincingly faked to outside observers.
Another set of papers has focused on correlations between overconfidence and social outcomes. Data from a student sample shows that overconfidence about grades is positively correlated with the estimate of one's ability by observers 34 , and survey measures of selfesteem are positively correlated with job market outcomes [35] [36] [37] . But causal inferences remain unresolved in these datasets, because one cannot rule out reverse causality and unobserved covariates of confidence and social success, such as beauty or extraversion 38 . We use informative but noisy feedback to manipulate private confidence and look at its effect on persuasion in a stylized labour market interaction. In the interaction, our use of incentives for both contestants (to convince others) and evaluators (to detect true performance) simulates environments outside of the laboratory where people have money at stake 39 . This complements previous studies that manipulate confidence to investigate its effect on outcomes such as cheating 40 or status allocation by team members 22 .
Our main experiment consists of two stages. In the self-deception stage, we uncover the effect of an experimentally generated social motive for self-deception on the confidence of the subject. In the deception stage, we measure the effect of higher confidence on persuasion, using exogenous variation in confidence generated by a feedback signal.
At the beginning of the self-deception stage, our 288 participants perform an intelligence test at their computer stations and receive a small remuneration depending on their performance relative to three other randomly selected subjects. We then separate subjects into a control group and a contestant group. The latter are truthfully informed that they can earn €15 later in the experiment, if they are able to persuade 'employers' of their superior performance on the intelligence test in brief face-to-face interactions. The control group does not have the opportunity to persuade employers, and receives no information about the interaction stage at this point.
Next, we elicit the private confidence of each subject about his or her performance in the intelligence test. We call this belief the 'prior belief ' of a subject. Prior beliefs are elicited using an incentivized procedure based on the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak paradigm that is often used in economics 41 . Participants indicate the probability P for which they are indifferent between winning a monetary prize with probability P and winning the same prize if they are in the 'top 2' , that is if their performance is among the two best performances of their randomly and anonymously selected peer group
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Peter Schwardmann 1 * and Joël van der Weele 2,3 of four. After participants indicate the point of indifference in a list of probabilities, one probability is randomly drawn from the list and participants are awarded their preferred lottery for that probability. This procedure has several advantages over other elicitation mechanisms, the most important being that reporting the true subjective probability of being in the top 2 is a dominant strategy for subjects regardless of their risk preferences 42 .
On the basis of Trivers' theory, we hypothesize that contestants (n = 144), who are informed of the profitable deception opportunity, will become more confident about their performance than the uninformed control group (n = 144). We find that the average prior beliefs among contestants (mean = 62.0%, s.d. = 17.74%) are 4.2 percentage points higher than beliefs among subjects in the control group (mean = 57.8%, s.d. = 18.4). The difference in confidence is statistically significant (two-sided t-test, t 286 = 1.97, P = 0.049, d = 0.23, 95% confidence interval (CI) = 0.012-8.39). The median and quartiles as well as the histograms of the two belief distributions are shown in Fig. 1a ,b, respectively. Table 1 presents the results of four ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models that serve to check the robustness of our treatment effect. The first column shows the raw treatment effect on prior beliefs as a percentage. In the second column, we control for individual test scores to rule out that the results are driven by differences in test scores between control and treatment group. In the third column, we add a dummy for each score as a more elaborate control for test scores. In all specifications, the statistically significant treatment effect on beliefs is roughly constant at about 4 percentage points. The positive coefficient of test scores in the second regression model tells us that beliefs correlate with actual performance and thus seem to be at least loosely tethered to reality. In the regression model in column 4, the dependent variable 'Belief bias' is a measure of individual over-and underconfidence, which is constructed by subtracting from the prior belief of a subject the average likelihood that a subject with the same test score is in the top 2 of his or her group of four. The treatment has a statistically significant effect on such overconfidence.
In Fig. 1a , a single outlier data point can be observed, which is from one subject in the control group who has a prior of 5%. When we remove this observation, the treatment effect of the main experiment is no longer significant at the 5% level (see Supplementary Results for the analysis). In light of this finding, it is reassuring that our results replicate in the follow-up experiment, as discussed below. Moreover, we note that it is not clear whether the outlier ought to be excluded in the first place. The subject in question was not in the top 2 and, therefore, rather realistic. Then, it is perfectly in line with Trivers' hypothesis that observing such realism becomes less likely when subjects are aware of a profitable opportunity to persuade.
To replicate our results and to better understand the underlying motives behind our treatment effect, we conducted a followup experiment with 400 subjects. We replicate our main result on self-deception. On average, participants who are informed about a profitable deception opportunity are more confident (mean = 60.8, s.d. = 18.2) than the control group (mean = 54.4, s.d. = 20.5). This difference is statistically significant (two-sided t-test, t 398 = 2.75, P = 0.0063, d = 0.32, 95% CI = 1.79-10.87). Further analyses are provided in the Supplementary Results. We also perform a mini meta-analysis by pooling the two samples. The treatment comparison is statistically significant (two-sided t-test, t 686 = 3.9033, P < 0.001, d = 0.31, 95% CI = 2.97-8.98). The corresponding equivalent of regression in Table 1 yields a statistically significant treatment dummy in all specifications (see Supplementary Table 3 ).
At the end of the follow-up experiment, we conducted several additional elicitations to further investigate the motivations behind self-deception. Notably, we aim to understand whether the desire to be more persuasive is a (subconscious) driver for self-deception. To this end, we incentivize subjects to state their belief that 'confidence pays'-that is, that a subject with higher confidence in the main experiment was more likely to get a higher evaluation. We find suggestive evidence that a persuasion motive is indeed at work. We also explicitly test for several alternative motives for self-deception, such as a wish to reduce one's guilt about lying, anticipatory utility concerns and a desire to appear consistent in front of the experimenter, and find no evidence for these. The Supplementary Results provide a detailed analysis of the follow-up experiment.
In the deception stage of the main experiment, we tested for the strategic benefits of higher confidence through its effect on persuasiveness. The 144 participants who were in the control group during the self-deception stage now take the role of employer and, in face-to-face interactions, interview the 144 participants in the role of contestant. We chose to make the interactions face-to-face rather than using written messages because Trivers' theory assigns an important role to physical ticks or give-away tells associated with low confidence. During the interactions, contestants are incentivized to convince employers that they did well on the intelligence test, whereas employers have an incentive to detect those contestants that truly were the best performers.
The interactions followed a speed-dating protocol. Equipped with a pen and evaluation sheets, employers leave their computer stations and sit down in front of the contestants. A group of four employers is matched with a group of four contestants. There are four rounds of interviews so that each of the four employers in a group interviews each of the four contestants in a group. Each interview takes place behind a partition to assure some level of privacy. On the ring of a bell, contestants say one sentence: 'I believe that my performance was in the top 2 of my group with ... per cent probability' . In the blank, each contestant verbally fills in a number between 0 and 100.
After the interviews, employers return to their computer stations and enter their evaluations as well as the verbal messages of the contestants into the computer. Each employer states the probability that they associated with each of the four contestants that they interviewed being in the top 2 of the contestant group. One of these evaluations is selected at random and the employer is paid according to the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism described above, with a chance to win €10 in case of a favourable outcome. A contestant is paid €15 if he or she received one of the two best evaluations by a randomly selected employer and nothing otherwise. Before the interviews, every contestant receives noisy feedback about his or her relative performance in the test and then again privately states his or her belief about how likely it is that he or she was in the top 2 of his or her group of four. We refer to the belief we elicit at this time as the 'posterior belief ' of a subject. Regarding the noisy feedback, contestants are truthfully told that the computer draws a ball from one of two virtual urns that contain 20 balls of two different colours. If their performance was actually in the top 2, then the ball would come from an urn with 15 black balls and 5 red balls. If their performance was not in the top 2, then the ball would come from an urn with 15 red balls and 5 black balls. Thus, although a black ball is good news about performance, the signal is noisy and some subjects randomly receive a ball of the wrong colour. It is this variation that we use to identify the effect of (over)confidence on persuasiveness. The merits of this design choice compared to other possible designs are discussed further in the Supplementary Discussion. Figure 2 shows the histograms of post-feedback beliefs for each performance level (top 2 and not top 2), separated by whether a subject received good or bad news. The signal has a strong effect on the beliefs of the contestants, which makes sense, given that it is informative. Within each panel, the difference between the grey and white bars shows how the noise component or error in the signal causes subjects with a similar performance to adopt different beliefs. This purely random shift in confidence is uncorrelated with any personal characteristics and can be exploited to estimate the causal effect of confidence on evaluations. However, such causal inference also requires that the feedback affects evaluations only through its effect on confidence. In order to not violate this condition, the minimalist nature of the interaction between employers and contestants assures that contestants are not able to communicate their signal.
We hypothesize that increased confidence makes participants more persuasive in their attempts to convince others of their superior performance. In the Supplementary Results, we consider the relationship between private confidence and communication strategies. Here, our main focus lies on the role of confidence in determining the evaluations of employers. To test our hypothesis, we use a series of linear regression models. The first four regression models in Table 2 focus on our baseline treatment. The OLS regression in column 1 features only a correlation. It shows that more confident contestants-that is, those with a higher posterior belief-receive 
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higher evaluations from employers. The regression in column 2 of Table 2 tells us that contestants who receive a good signal obtain higher evaluations, controlling for whether the contestant actually was in the top 2. This demonstrates that confidence has a positive causal effect on evaluations by employers.
To obtain a more concrete estimate of the size of the causal effect of confidence on evaluations, we carry out an instrumental variable estimation known as two-stage least squares. In the first stage, we quantify the variation in posterior beliefs that is induced by our 'instrument' , the noise component of the feedback signal. This firststage regression is reported in the Supplementary Table 5 and shows that the instrument explains a substantial part of posterior beliefs. We then take the variation in beliefs explained by the instrument in the first stage, and use it to estimate the effect of beliefs on evaluations in the second stage. To make sure that these estimates are based only on random variation in beliefs, both first and second stage regressions include the actual performance, that is, whether the subject was in the top 2, as a control variable.
The results of the second stage regressions are reported in column 3 of Table 2 . A 1 percentage point increase in the posterior belief leads to a 0.32 percentage point increase in the evaluation that a contestant receives. The fact that the coefficient in the instrumental variable regression exceeds the coefficient in the OLS regression is indicative of the OLS regression being biased by endogeneity. We cannot be sure about the exact reason; one possible cause is an omitted personality trait, such as arrogance, that is positively correlated with confidence and negatively correlated with evaluations. Although we do not measure the arrogance of our subjects, we do measure the trait 'assertiveness' on the 'Big Five Aspect Scales' in the extroversion domain 43 . As described in Supplementary Table  6 , we find that there is a negative relationship between assertiveness and evaluations, but the small correlation is not significant and cannot explain the difference between the OLS and instrumental variable results.
To investigate how much of the effect of beliefs on evaluations works through the verbal messages that contestants send to employers, we add messages to the set of regressors in column 4. Messages are a statistically significant predictor of evaluations and when we include them into the instrumental variable regression, the coefficient of posterior beliefs decreases slightly but remains statistically significant. These results suggest that higher confidence leads to higher evaluations through both verbal and nonverbal channels. Quantitatively, the two channels appear to be of roughly equal importance. In Supplementary Table 6 , we establish that these results are robust to more flexible model specifications for messages and the inclusion of control variables related to characteristics of the contestant, the employer and other contestants in the same group.
The model in column 5 of Table 2 presents the deteminants of the evaluations of the employers in a lie-detection treatment. In contrast to our baseline condition, employers in the lie-detection treatment followed a small lie-detection tutorial, based on psychological research on indicators that have diagnostic power for lies 44, 45 . We hypothesize that the effect of the confidence of the contestants is larger in a situation in which employers have a higher ability to spot lies. The literature on lie detection generally finds that subjects in the laboratory are not great at spotting lies in others, although they do slightly better than chance 16, 39 . However, these studies may 
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Nature HumaN BeHaviour understate lie-detection abilities outside of the laboratory, where we seek to deceive spouses, professional recruiters and loan officers. The lie-detection condition was designed to erode some of the artificial advantage bestowed on the deceiver by the laboratory context. Unfortunately, owing to a randomization failure in the feedback signal in the lie-detection treatment, very few contestants received a signal that did not align with their actual performance. This makes it hard to distinguish between actual performance and beliefs. Moreover, we find that our instrument for beliefs in the lie-detection condition is rather weak (see the Supplementary Table 5 , column 3). As a result, it is difficult to interpret these data, and we merely report them here for the sake of full disclosure. Taken at face value, the results in column 5 of Table 2 would suggest that employers in the lie-detection treatment are not responsive to the confidence of the contestants at all, but are able to identify true ability. This would be surprising, because spotting true ability is different from spotting lies, defined as increases of stated confidence over truly held confidence, which is what employers in the condition were trained to detect. The Supplementary Results provide further analyses of the lie-detection treatment and establish robustness of our results to pooling data from the lie-detection and baseline treatments. Our findings are succinctly summarized in the words of Mark Twain, who writes in his autobiography: "When a person cannot deceive himself the chances are against his being able to deceive other people". We find that confidence management is an adaptive cognitive technology, enabling trade-offs between the benefits of self-enhancement and realism. Overconfidence represents an optimal response to environments in which social influence and persuasion are often crucial 14, 46, 47 . One implication of our findings is that overconfidence is likely to be more prevalent in settings in which its strategic value is highest, that is, in cases in which measures of true ability are noisy, competition is fierce and persuasion is an important part of success. It may arise in employer-employee relationships because of its strategic benefits in job interviews and wage negotiations. Arguably, confidence may be even more valuable among the self-employed, whose economic survival often depends more immediately on persuading investors and customers. We would also expect overconfidence to be rife amongst high-level professionals in finance, law and politics.
methods
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Amsterdam research priority area Behavioral Economics. The experiments took place at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA). Subjects were randomly recruited from the MELESSA subject pool using the recruitment system ORSEE 48 . The experiments were programmed in z-tree 49 and random assignment to groups and conditions within the experiments was implemented using the randomnumber-generating function in z-tree. Both experiments lasted slightly over 1 h and the average subject earned €16.45 (minimum, €4; maximum, €28.5).
Our main experiment featured 288 participants, divided over 18 sessions of 16 subjects each. Overall, 61% of the participants was female and the average age was 23.1 years. We ran a first set of sessions, featuring 192 subjects, in March 2015. The number of subjects was determined on the basis of budgetary constraints and a single pilot with 32 subjects. In October 2016, we ran an additional 6 sessions, comprising 96 subjects, as a robustness check requested by a referee. All of the results in the combined sample were already obtained in data from the first set of sessions. The sample size for the follow-up experiment was determined by recruiting the maximum number of subjects that remained in the MELESSA subject pool, as estimated by the laboratory manager. This resulted in a total sample of 400 subjects. Of the total pool, 59% of the participants was female and the average age was 24.6 years. No participants were excluded from the analysis for either experiment.
All statistical tests in our regressions use threshold levels of α = 0.05, α = 0.01 and α = 0.001, and we report P values for all of our main results. For the t-tests of our deception stage results, we test for normality of the samples using the Shapiro-Francia test. We cannot reject normality at the 5% for any of our data, unless otherwise reported. All reported tests are two-sided. No data points were excluded from the analysis. Data collection and analysis were not performed blind to the conditions of the experiments.
Detailed procedures. After coming into the laboratory, participants spent 15 min on an introduction to the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism we that used to elicit beliefs. The mechanism requires participants to indicate which probability P makes them indifferent between winning a monetary prize with probability P and winning the same prize when an uncertain event E occurs. After participants indicated the point of indifference in a list of probabilities, one probability is randomly drawn from the list and participants are awarded their preferred lottery for that probability. We told subjects that reporting the true subjective probability of E maximizes their chance of winning the prize. In contrast to other elicitation mechanisms, the incentives for truthful reporting do not depend on risk preferences. The veracity of this claim has been established previously by different authors 42 . We only proceeded once all subjects correctly answered four control questions about the belief elicitation.
The main experiment had two parts, which we refer to as the 'self-deception stage' and the 'deception stage' . In the self-deception stage, we investigated whether the announcement of a profitable deception opportunity had an influence on the beliefs of the participants about their own performance in an intelligence test. To this end, we separated the group into contestants, who were informed about the later deception opportunity, and a control group of participants, who were not. In the deception stage, we investigated whether (over)confidence made the contestants more persuasive. Contestants competed to persuade employers of their superior performance on the intelligence test in a face-to-face interaction. Employers were the participants who constituted the control group in the self-deception stage of the experiment. The sequencing of experimental tasks is depicted in Supplementary Table 1 . Translated experimental instructions can be found online at https://osf.io/v2r3q/. The design of the self-deception stage of the follow-up experiment is identical. The deception stage of the follow-up experiment was slightly different and is described in the Supplementary Information.
Self-deception stage. Participants were then divided into anonymous groups of four and proceeded to the intelligence test. The test consisted of 15 Raven matrices of varying difficulty and participants had 10 min to solve as many as they could. Participants were awarded two points for each correct answer and lost one point for each incorrect or omitted answer. The subjects with the two top scores in their anonymous group of four earned €2. Their earnings, and hence their ranking within the group, were only communicated to them at the end of the experiment.
We administered our main treatment after the intelligence test. Of the four groups of four in each session, two groups were assigned to the role of contestants and two groups were designated as controls. While the control group was not told anything about the deception stage at this point, the contestants received a short summary of the instructions for the deception stage, which are reproduced in the Supplementary Methods.
Next, we used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to elicit the prior belief of each subject about the probability that he or she is among the top 2 performers in his or her group of four. We refer to this event as 'top 2' . The prize for the elicitation was €3. The instructions made it very salient that elicited beliefs were strictly confidential and would never be shown to another subject.
After participants submitted their prior beliefs, we gave them noisy feedback on their performance. Participants were told that they would be shown a ball drawn from one of two virtual urns, which contained 20 balls of different colours. If their performance was actually in the top 2, the ball would come from an urn with 15 black balls and 5 red balls. If their performance was not in the top 2, the ball would come from an urn with 15 red balls and 5 black balls. Therefore, a black ball constituted good news about their performance. After subjects had observed the ball, they reported their posterior belief about being in the top 2.
Deception stage. For the face-to-face interactions, the 16 subjects in a session were divided into two groups, each of which consisted of four contestants and four employers. The latter formed the control group in the first stage of the experiment. Before the interviews began, employers were given an evaluation sheet for each contestant on which to write down the message of the contestant and their evaluations of the contestant's relative performance, honesty, confidence, likability and attractiveness. The interviews followed a speed-dating protocol. Employers left their computer stations and sat down in front of the contestants. There were four rounds of interviews so that every employer would get to interview each of the four contestants in the same group.
On the ring of a bell, contestants said one sentence: 'I believe that my performance was in the top 2 of my group with ... per cent probability' . In the blank, each contestant verbally filled in a number between 0 and 100 that we refer to as a contestant's message. During the interviews, none of the 144 contestants said anything more than this sentence. After the sentence was said, there were a few seconds in which employers could scrutinize contestants' faces and body language, before the bell rang again to mark the end of a round. Employers were given time to fill in their evaluation sheets, before moving on to the next contestant.
After the four rounds of interviews, employers returned to their computer stations and entered their evaluations as well as contestants' messages into the computer. Each employer had to state the probability he or she associated with each of the contestants being in the top 2. The computer program enforced that the four elicited probabilities, elicited as percentages between 0 and 100, added up to 200, so employers had to revise their original evaluations if necessary. One of these Letters Nature HumaN BeHaviour evaluations was selected at random and the employer was paid for it according to the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism described above, with a chance to win €10 in case of a favourable outcome. The contestant was paid €15 if he or she was among the two best evaluated contestants by the employer in the selected round, and nothing otherwise.
At the same time, contestants participated in a task that elicited their degree of lying aversion 50 . During this task, participants are asked to imagine themselves in the position of a company CEO, who can earn money by deceiving shareholders about the value of the company. Again using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, participants are asked to indicate repeatedly whether they would report deceptively or not, for which the amount of money they could earn from doing so was increased in four steps from 0 cents to 120 cents. After seeing their pay-offs in the experiment, all subjects filled out a questionnaire about their background characteristics and their assertiveness.
In one third of the sessions, employers participated in a lie-detection tutorial before they embarked on the interview. The tutorial featured on-screen written instructions and lasted 3 min. The tutorial used four lie-detection tips from the wiki http://www.wikihow.com/Detect-Lies on how to recognize 'tells' associated with lying, namely fidgeting, face-touching, fast breathing and incongruent facial expressions. In addition, it explained that avoidance of eye contact is an unreliable indicator of lying. Contestants in the sessions of the lie-detection treatment did not know about the tutorial. Corresponding author(s): Peter Schwardmann Last updated by author(s): Jun 18, 2019 Reporting Summary Nature Research wishes to improve the reproducibility of the work that we publish. This form provides structure for consistency and transparency in reporting. For further information on Nature Research policies, see Authors & Referees and the Editorial Policy Checklist.
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